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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a medical malpractice case involving allegations of malpractice and 
lack of informed consent Plaintiffs Franz (the patient) and Betty Suhadolnik, (Appellants) 
appeal the February 18, 2010 decision of the Honorable Judge Patrick Owen in which he 
granted Scott Pressman M.D.'s (Respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 
Respondents contend that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed in all 
respects because the affidavit of Appellants' expert, John Hofbauer, M.D., demonstrates 
that he failed to adequately familiarize himself with the local standard of health care 
practice applicable to Dr. Pressman in Boise, Idaho, in 2006. Because Dr. Hofbauer's 
affidavit failed to meet the admissibility requirements of Rule 56(e}, the District Court 
properly concluded it was insufficient to create an issue of fact. 
B. Statement Of Facts. 
On October 31, 2005, the patient, Franz Suhadolnik presented to Dr. 
Pressman's office with complaints of worsening vision at which point a patient history was 
obtained and documented by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 131). The fact a health history was 
obtained was confirmed by the patient in his deposition. (R. p. 33 [depo p. 49 to 52]). As 
the timing of cataract surgery is often left to the patient when they feel their vision is getting 
bad enough to warrant surgical intervention, the patient elected to defer undergoing 
cataract surgery for several months. (R. p. 33 [depo p. 52 to 53]). The patient returned 
1 It should be noted that Respondents' Brief is submitted on behalf of Defendants Dr. Scott 
Pressman and The Eye Associates, P.A., both of whom were granted summary judgment as a result of 
Judge Owen's decision which is at issue in this appeal. 
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on May 30, 2006 at which point his preoperative exam was performed and a second 
patient history was documented by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 132, 141). 
The following day, on May 31, 2006 the patient presented to the Eagle Eye 
Surgery Center in Eagle where he underwent another documented health history followed 
by cataract surgery on his right eye performed by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 70, 142-144). The 
purpose of this surgery was to remove the dense cataract from the patient's right eye and 
replace it with an artificial lens which would allow him to see more clearly through his eye. 
(R. p. 70). During the surgery, the zonular connections surrounding the patient's capsular 
bag came loose which allowed the lens capsule to come out of position. (R. p. 155 [depo 
p. 11 D. This complication resulted in the vitreous fluid contained within the posterior part 
of the patient's eye to prolapse forward into the anterior chamber. Id. As a result, Dr. 
Pressman was required to remove the prolapsed vitreous fluid and place an intraocular 
lens in the anterior portion of the patient's eye instead of inside the capsular bag. (R. p. 
144). 
C. Course Of Proceedings. 
Dissatisfied with the outcome of his surgery, the patient and his wife 
thereafter filed suit alleging malpractice and lack of informed consent. (R. p. 7). Counsel 
for Dr. Pressman thereafter answered the complaint, engaged in discovery, and then filed 
a motion for summary judgment. (R. p. 11-16). This motion was supported by Dr. 
Pressman's Affidavit which states, in part, that as a board certified ophthalmologist he 
complied in all respects with the standard of health care practice applicable to him for the 
time and place in question, Boise, Idaho, 2006, and that the care he provided was 
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consistent with the care typically provided in the Boise, Idaho community in 2006. (R. p. 
70). 
Consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code § 39-4506, Dr. Pressman's 
affidavit also states that he disclosed the pertinent medical facts to the patient such that 
the patient was sufficiently aware of the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks 
ordinarily involved in the medical treatment to be provided, including the fact that the 
patient may need further surgery and the risk that he may experience injury to and/or loss 
of the vision in his right eye. (R. p. 65-66, 114-5). Dr. Pressman's affidavit further states 
that the requisite pertinent facts he disclosed to the patient prior to performing cataract 
surgery represent those which would ordinarily be given by a like ophthalmologist and 
cataract surgeon of good standing practicing in Boise in 2006. (R. p. 65-66, 114-5). 
Plaintiffs opposed the defense motion with the Affidavit of Dr. John Hofbauer, 
a Beverly Hills, California ophthalmologist. (R. p. 107 to 111). Dr. Hofbauer claimed to 
have educated himself on the local standard of practice based on his experience and 
training and based upon his review of the patient's medical records and the deposition of 
Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 109). Following oral argument, on February 18, 2010, the District 
Court concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit lacked foundation and thus the Plaintiffs' 
showing was not adequate and granted Dr. Pressman's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
to both counts of the complaint. (R. p. 182-195). No motion for reconsideration was ever 
filed and the District Court entered a judgment in this matter in favor of the Defendants on 
March 17, 2010. (R. p. 197-98). This appeal followed. 
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II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that by merely reviewing the 
patient's medical records and the deposition of Dr. Pressman that the Appellants' expert, 
Dr. Hofbauer, had failed to adequately familiarize himself with the local standard of health 
care practice applicable to Dr. Pressman? 
2. Did the District Court err in concluding that Appellants failed to provide 
evidence of any statewide minimum standards of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman 
regarding what is required in order for an Idaho physician to obtain an adequate patient 
history? 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Have Appellants waived the issue of informed consent contained 
within Count II of their complaint by failing to provide any briefing or authority on this issue 
in their opening brief? 
2. Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 due to the Appellants' 
failure to identify any misapplication of the law and/or abuse of discretion by the District 
Court? 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Appel/ate Court's 
standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 
(2006); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 225, 999 P.2d 877, 
880 (2000); see also First Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790,964 P.2d 654, 657 
(1998). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law summary 
judgment is proper." Id. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 4 
Summary judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is the 
"principal tool ... by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and 
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and 
private resources." Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52281, *9-10 (D. Idaho 2008) 
(quoting Ce/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 377 (1986) (alterations in original)). In 
evaluating the sufficiency of the materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment, 
the Court must bear in mind the distinction between the requirements for admissibility of 
expert opinion testimony under Rule 56(e) and the test for sufficiency of such testimony 
in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The "admissibility of affidavits under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a threshold question to be analyzed before applying 
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules required when reviewing motions 
for summary judgment." Edmunds at 871,136 P.3d 342. The Court must look at the 
affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which taken as 
true, would render the testimony admissible. Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163,45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002)). 
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in the granting of summary 
judgment, it is first necessary to examine the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Edmunds, 
142 Idaho at 872, 136 P.3d 343. Furthermore, "when reviewing the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Id. "A district court's 
evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court, unless there has been a clear abuse 
of discretion." McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group -Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 
219,222, 159 P.3d 856,861 (2007). To determine whether the trial court has abused its 
discretion, we consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether 
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it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards, and whether it reached its discretion by an exercise of reason." Shane v. Blair, 
139 Idaho 126,128-129,75 P.3d 180,182-183 (2003) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). See also Lamar 
Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)). 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. By Failing To Advance Any Argument Or Briefing On The Issue 
Of Informed Consent, This Portion Of Appellants' Case Should 
Be Deemed Waived. 
Appellants' opening brief is entirely devoid of any argument or briefing 
regarding: 1) the issue of lack of informed consent; 2) the adequacy of Dr. Hofbauer's 
affidavit as to the issue of informed consent; and 3) whether with the District Court's erred 
by granting the Respondents' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of the 
Complaint. 2 A claim for lack of informed consent is a totally separate claim under Idaho 
law from a claim for malpractice as set forth under Idaho Code § 39-4506, et seq. 
Appellants' issues on appeal do not refer to the issue of informed consent at all. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 14). Respondents contend that given the failure to address this issue 
by way of argument or briefing, that Appellants have either abandoned this issue on appeal 
or should be deemed to have waived this issue on appeal based on the authorities set forth 
below. 
2 As the District Court found, there was nothing in the deposition testimony of Dr. Pressman 
which provided a foundation for the informed consent opinions advanced in Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit. (R. p. 
192). Dr. Pressman specifically stated in his deposition that he did not know what the standard of practice 
was for advising patients regarding whether the use of Flomax increased a patient's risk of complications 
during cataract surgery because the association between the two was inconclusive and only recently 
reported. (R. p. 156 [depo p. 14-15]). 
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Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) governs what is required of the Appellants' 
Brief. The rule states: "The brief of the appellant shall contain the ... argument. The 
argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the transcript and records relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). This Court has made it 
clear that it will not consider an issue which is "not supported by argument and authority 
in the opening brief. ... [and] regardless of whether an issue is only mentioned in passing 
and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this 
Court." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho _, __ , 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,528,181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008»; Inama v. Boise 
County ex rei. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003». 
This Court stated in Bach: 
Where an appellant fails to assert his 
assignments of error with particularity and to 
support his position with sufficient authority, 
those assignments of error are too indefinite to 
be heard by the court. A genera! attack on the 
findings and conclusions of the district court, 
without specific reference to evidentiary or legal 
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. This 
Court will not search the records on appeal for 
error. Consequently, to the extent that an 
assignment of error is not argued and supported 
in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be 
waived. 
Bach, 229 P.3d 1146, 1154. (internal citations omitted). 
In the absence of any argument or authority, the above precedent mandates 
that the issue of informed consent, (including Count II of the Complaint) be deemed 
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abandoned and/or waived for purposes of this appeal and therefore no longer part of this 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Concluded That Dr. Hofbauer's Affidavit Failed To Comply With 
The Admissibility Requirements Of Rule 56(e) And Idaho Code § 
6-1 013(c)(1). 
"Admissibility of expert testimony requires personal knowledge." Shane v. 
Blair, 139 Idaho 126,129,75 P.3d 180, 183 (2003). Appellants' expert, Dr. Hofbauer, is 
an out of state expert. (R. p. 89). In order for his opinions as to the Defendant's alleged 
failure to comply with the local standard of practice to be admissible, he was required to 
demonstrate that he has actual and personal knowledge of the local standard of health 
care practice applicable to Dr. Pressman as required by Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code § 6-
1013(1 )(c). The question of admissibility of affidavits under Rule 56 (e) is a "threshold 
question to be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences 
rules when reviewing motions for summary judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 
208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). 
Appellants cite numerous case authorities which discuss various ways in 
which an out-of-area expert may familiarize himself with the local standard of practice. 
(Appellants' Brief at p. 18-22). Respondents agree that this Court has identified and 
discussed over the years several methods by which an out-of-area expert can accomplish 
this pivotal foundational task. However, Respondents contend that the authorities relied 
3 Respondents object to the data contained within footnote 2 of the Appellants' Brief 
regarding an alleged Dear Doctor Letter from the FDA and ask that it be stricken and/or not considered by 
this Court. This document and/or letter is not part of the record on appeal, it was not before the District 
Court, and it should not be considered for any purpose as part of this appellate proceeding. 
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on by Appellants do not at all support or approve the manner and method by which Dr. 
Hofbauer attempted to familiarize himself with the local standard of practice in this case. 
It is well settled that experts testifying as to the standard of practice in 
medical malpractice actions must show that they have familiarized themselves with the 
standard for a particular profession for the relevant community and time. Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51,995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Kolin v. St. 
Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 331, 940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997)). They must 
also state how they became familiar with the standard of practice for the particular health 
care professional. Id. "The witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from 
experience or study of the standards of the speciality of the defendant physician sufficient 
to enable him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to 
those particular standards .... " Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
168,45 P.3d 816, 824 (2002). 
A common and approved means for an out-of-area expert to obtain 
knowledge of the local standard of care is by inquiring of a local specialist. Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Watts v. Lynn, 
125 Idaho 341,347,870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994)). As observed by this Court in Grover 
v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002): 
Although these cases do not provide a clear-cut 
set of rules on what an out-of-state expert must 
do to become familiar with the local standard of 
care, these cases demonstrate that this Court 
has been willing to affirm a district court's grant 
of summary judgment on this basis when the 
plaintiff's expert failed to contact any local 
physician. Likewise, the Court has been 
reluctant to grant a defendant's motion for 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 9 
summary judgment when the plaintiffs expert did 
not consult a local physician possessing 
expertise on the area at issue. 
Grover, 137 Idaho at 250, 46 P.3d at 1108. (citing Keyserv. Garner, 129 Idaho 112,117, 
922 P.2d 409, 414 (Ct. App. 1996)). With this precedent as background, Dr. Hofbauer's 
affidavit contains the following conclusory statement: 
I have knowledge of the standard of care as it 
existed in Boise, Idaho, during May of 2006 as it 
related to the provision of medical care to Franz 
Suhadolnik by Dr. Pressman. My knowledge 
comes from my experience and training, as well 
as from the testimony provided by Dr. Pressman 
in his deposition and of the medical records of 
Franz Suhadolnik. (R. p.108-109). 
The District Court concluded there was a lack of foundation for Dr. Hofbauer's 
opinions based on what he did to try and obtain actual knowledge of the local standard of 
practice. (R. p. 189-193). Respondents' contend that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by ruling that the contents of Dr. Pressman's 59 page deposition were 
insufficient as a matter of law to provide Dr. Hofbauer with the requisite "actual knowledge" 
of the local community standard of practice necessary to meet the admissibility 
requirements of Rule 56(e). This Rule provides: 
Form of Affidavits - Further Testimony - Defense 
Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence. and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). (emphasis added). See also Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 
137 Idaho 160,164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212, 
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868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994). In addition to the requirements of Rule 56(e), Idaho Code 
§ 6-1013 provides in pertinent part: 
The applicable standard of practice and such a 
defendant's failure to meet such standard must 
be established in such cases by such a plaintiff 
by testimony of one (1) or more knowledgeable, 
competent expert witnesses, and such expert 
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if 
the foundation therefore is first laid ... 
Idaho Code § 6-1013. (emphasis added). 
To be admissible under Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code § 6-1013, Plaintiffs are 
required to state within the body of Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit precisely how he became 
familiar with the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman. See Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000); Hayward v. Jack's Pharm., 
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 626 (2005). Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit demonstrates the following 
undisputed facts: First, he is an ophthalmologist and therefore of the same specialty as Dr. 
Pressman. Second, he is not an Idaho physician, but rather an out-of-area expert in 
private practice in Beverly Hills, California. Third, there is no evidence that he ever 
practiced medicine in Idaho. Fourth, there is no evidence that he ever: a) discussed the 
patient's care with any physician from Boise; b) discussed local standards of practice 
applicable to Dr. Pressman with any physician who practiced in Boise during the time and 
place in question, namely 2006; or c) discussed with any local Boise physician whether 
there were any differences between the local standard and any so-called national standard 
of practice. Fifth, Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit states that the entire basis for his knowledge 
regarding the local standard of practice comes solely from his review of Dr. Pressman's 
deposition and the medical records in this case. (R. p. 108-109). 
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This Court previously held that an expert cannot become familiar with the 
local standard of practice merely by reviewing hospital records and the actions of a local 
physician. See Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,297-98,815 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1991). 
This leaves Dr. Hofbauer's review of Dr. Pressman's deposition as the only remaining way 
by which Appellants' out-of-area expert could have acquired actual knowledge of the 
applicable standards of practice. Respondents agree that reviewing an appropriate 
deposition is one method this Court has authorized as a way of imparting actual knowledge 
of the local standard of practice to an out-of-area expert. However, the feasibility of this 
option obviously depends entirely on what testimony is contained within that deposition. 
This Court stated in Groverv. Smith, 137 Idaho 247,251 (2002): "An out-of-
state expert can become familiar with the local standard of care by inquiring of a local 
specialist or by "review of a deposition stating that the local standard does not vary from 
the national standard! coupled with the expert's personal knowledge of the national 
standard." (Quoting Perryv. Magic Valley Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51-52,995 P.2d 
816,821-22 (2000)). (emphasis added). In this case, the District Court properly concluded 
that the contents of Dr. Pressman's deposition did not provide Dr. Hofbauer with the 
information required to lay a foundation for his opinion that he has actual knowledge of the 
local standard of practice. Notably absent from Dr. Pressman's deposition is any inquiry 
by Appellants' counsel regarding whether there is any national standard of practice 
applicable in this case and if so, what it required. Such a line of inquiry was deemed by 
this Court in both Grover and Perry to be critical in order to impart actual knowledge to the 
out-of-area expert. 
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Nowhere in Dr. Pressman's deposition does he state that the local Boise 
standard of practice for an ophthalmologist in 2006 was the same as any alleged 
standard of practice nor was he even asked by opposing counsel whether there was a 
national standard of practice applicable to him. Instead, Dr. Hofbauer relies totally upon 
what can only be described as a few generic and nonspecific questions posed in 
Pressman's deposition. For example, Dr. Pressman agreed that the standard of practice 
requires him to know how to perform cataract surgery, it requires him to keep current on 
medical literature in the field and it requires him to take an adequate patient history. (R. p. 
154-55). From such basic and conclusory statements, Plaintiffs jump to the conclusion that 
Dr. Hofbauer has actual knowledge of the local standard of practice applicable to Dr. 
Pressman. 
The District Court properly disagreed. There is nothing in Dr. Pressman's 
deposition that discusses what the local standard of practice required of him in 2006 in 
order to know how to properly perform cataract surgery. Similarly, there is nothing in Dr. 
Pressman's deposition which discusses what he was required to do as an ophthalmologist 
in Boise in 2006 in order to keep current on medical literature in his field. Furthermore, 
nothing in Dr. Pressman's deposition discusses what is required of ophthalmologists 
practicing in Boise in 2006 in order to obtain an "adequate" patient history. Finally, nothing 
in Dr. Pressman's deposition says the standard of practice required him to do something 
other than what he did in this case with respect to the issue of informed consent. 4 As a 
result, the District Court correctly concluded there was a complete lack of foundation for 
4 In fact, regarding the issue of consent, in his deposition Dr. Pressman specifically stated 
that the standard of practice applicable to him in 2006 did not require him to disclose to his patients 
medication Flomax carried with it any increased risk of complications. (R. p. 166 [depo p. 55, II. 5-9]). 
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Dr. Hofbauer's opinion that he has actual knowledge of the local standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Pressman. 
Appellants rely upon the case of Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 
P.2d 854 (1992) to support their appeal. Kozlowski involved the admissibility of expert 
testimony at trial. In Kozlowski, however, the plaintiff's out-of-state expert reviewed a 
deposition in which a local specialist testified that the local standard was NO different than 
the national standard. Id. 121 Idaho at 829,828 P.2d at 858. Under that circumstance, this 
Court found that the plaintiff's expert was sufficiently familiar with the local standard of 
practice and that the trial court erred by not allowing his testimony at trial. Id. at 830,828 
P.2d at 859. No such testimony can be found in the deposition of Dr. Pressman upon 
which Dr. Hofbauer relies for his foundation. 
Instead, this case is more analogous to the facts presented in Rhodehouse 
v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 (1994). In Rhodehouse, the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice case argued that his out-of-area expert, Dr. Jenkins, became sufficiently 
familiar with the local standard of practice through his review of the deposition of the 
defendant physician, Dr. Stutts, and his review of the radiology films and hospital records. 
125 Idaho at 212,868 P.2d at 1228. Unlike the physician in Kozlowski, Dr. Stutts NEVER 
stated in his deposition that the local standard of practice was the same as any so-called 
national standard, nor was there any allegation that Dr. Stutts made any direct reference 
to the local standard of practice which would impart the knowledge necessary to lay the 
foundation for the plaintiff's expert's opinions. 
Consistent with this Court's holding in Rhodehouse, Dr. Pressman's 
deposition similarly does not state that the local standard of practice is or was the same 
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as any national standard. Because Dr. Hofbauer has otherwise failed to obtain actual 
knowledge of the local standard of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman in 2006, there is 
no foundation for his opinions. Instead, all we are left with is the conclusory statement by 
Dr. Hofbauer which fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e). The ineffectiveness of 
such conclusory statements was previously discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,775 P.2d 106 (1989): 
Thus, an expert from outside the state must 
demonstrate that he possesses knowledge of 
the local community standard. If he is board 
certified in the same specialty, he must, at a 
minimum, inquire of a local specialist to 
determine whether the local community standard 
varies from the national standard for that board 
certified specialty. Totally insufficient are 
statements such as Dr. Hall's naked assertion 
that because he is familiar with the national 
standard of care he is also "familiar with 
what is expected of a board certified 
orthopedic surgeon in Boise." Dr. Hall's 
affidavits show no effort to obtain 
information regarding the local standard of 
care and, as the trial court noted, are 
"conclusory statements which are incapable 
of objective evaluation by anyone . . . ." 
Consequently, there was no showing of a 
genuine issue of fact which must be tried. The 
trial court did not err in entering summary 
judgment for Dr. Lenzi. 
Strode, 116 Idaho at 216. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also, McDaniel v. 
Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, L.L.C., 144 Idaho 219, 223 (2007) (stating 
that at a minimum, an out-of-state expert making such a claim is required to "inquire of a 
local specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national 
standard."); Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 
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816 (2002) (the out-of-state expert's opinion lacked foundation where he had talked with 
a Boise physician practicing internal medicine but there was no showing that the Boise 
physician would know the standard of care for emergency room physicians in Boise). 
Under the facts of this case, the conclusory statements by Dr. Hofbauer are 
similarly "incapable of objective evaluation by anyone" and therefore insufficient to render 
his affidavit admissible under Rule 56(e). Strode, 116 Idaho at 216,775 P.2d at 108. As 
a result, the Appellants failed to create an issue of fact regarding their claim that Dr. 
Pressman violated the standard of practice and the District Court properly granted the 
defense motion for summary judgment. 
c. Appellants Have Produced No Evidence Of There Being Any 
Statewide Minimum Standard of Practice As To What Is Required 
Of An Ophthalmologist Like Dr. Pressman In Order to Obtain An 
"Adequate" Patient History. 
Appellants also rely on the case of Groverv. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 
1105 (2002), to support their argument that Dr. Pressman's deposition testimony provided 
Dr. Hofbauer with a sufficient foundation. The allegations in Grover, however, are 
substantially factually dissimilar to the case at bar. Grover involved a medical malpractice 
claim against Dr. Smith, a Fruitland, Idaho general dentist. Id. 137 Idaho at 248,46 P.3d 
at 1106. The patient was prescribed pain killers by Dr. Smith over the phone for 
complaints of pain located above her right temple. Without ever examining the patient and 
without ever taking any patient history of any kind, Dr. Smith diagnosed the pain as being 
part of a continuing pain the patient had experienced with her upper left teeth. Id. 
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
finding the Plaintiffs expert affidavits to be deficient in foundation. Id. 137 Idaho at 249, 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 16 
46 P.3d at 1107. On appeal, this Court focused on the sufficiency of the affidavits filed by 
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Thurmond, an out-of-area expert who was also a professor of 
dentistry at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. As part of his affidavit testimony, 
Dr. Thurmond indicated that he had spoken to other Idaho dentists regarding the standards 
of practice applicable to the defendant in Fruitland during the time in question and that he 
was also aware of the minimum training requirements placed on dentists in order to 
become licensed in Idaho due to the relationship between Idaho State University and 
Creighton University where he taught and his experience observing the administering of 
the Idaho State Dental Board Examination. Id. at 251-52,46 P.3d 1109-10. 
One of the allegations in Grover was that Dr. Smith had failed to take a 
patient history before arriving at a diagnosis and administering pain medication for a tooth 
ache when the patient was actually experiencing the precursors to what became a severe 
stroke. Dr. Thurmond opined that taking a health history of a patient was a basic, 
elementary standard required by all dentists in Idaho. Id. at 252,46 P.3d at 1110. This 
Court considered the fact that under Idaho Code §§ 54-901 through 54-934, the state of 
Idaho had adopted national standards of care as set forth in the Idaho Dental Practices 
Act. Id. at 250, 46 P.3d at 1108. This Court concluded that because taking a patient 
history represented a basic requirement applicable to all dentists in Idaho pursuant to 
Idaho Board of Dentistry, and as set forth as part of the factual basis for the opinions in Dr. 
Thurmond's affidavits, that the local standard of practice could not be less than this 
statewide minimum standard. Id. at 252, 46 P.3d at 1110. 
The Grover decision is distinguishable from the case at bar because there 
was evidence before the court of a statewide minimum standard of practice that dentists 
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were required to take a patient history. In this case, there is no evidence in the record of 
any statewide minimum standard for ophthalmologists regarding the nature or adequacy 
of the patient medical history they are required to obtain in order to practice medicine in 
Idaho. Furthermore, unlike Dr. Thurmond who indicated he spoke with numerous Idaho 
dentists, it is undisputed that Dr. Hofbauer made no effort to talk to any ophthalmologist 
in Idaho or anywhere else about anything in this case. Moreover, there is undisputed 
evidence in the record before this Court, as set out in the above statement of facts, that 
this patient's medical history was, in fact, taken on at least three occasions before his 
cataract surgery took place. See supra pp. 2-3. Finally, a critical distinguishable fact exists 
between the Grover case and the case at bar: the opinion of Dr. Hofbauer is not that Dr. 
Pressman violated the standard of practice by failing to take ANY patient history (as was 
opined by Dr. Thurmond in Grover), but rather that Dr. Pressman violated the standard of 
practice by failing to take an ADEQUATE patient history. (R. p. 109). 
Appellants also rely on this Court's decision in Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy 
Inc., 141 Idaho 622,115 P.3d 713 (2005) for the proposition that a defendant physician 
cannot adopt a standard of practice lower than any standard that may be imposed at the 
facility where the patient was treated. (Appellants' Brief, pp.22-23). Hayward involved a 
medical malpractice suit against a defendant physician, who, simUltaneous to his role as 
a physician, also acted as medical director in a nursing home facility where the plaintiffs 
father was cared for. Id., 141 Idaho 622, 115 P.3d 713. This Court discussed how "in 
cases where state or federal laws or regulations set forth minimum requirements for 
licensure of health care providers, that local communities may not adopt lower standards. 
Id. at 628, 115 P.3d 719. Respondents maintain that the Hayward decision is not 
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applicable as there are no state or federal laws or regulations before this Court or which 
Appellants' expert asserts operate to set any minimum standards of practice applicable to 
Dr. Pressman. Absent any such standards, then the standard to which Dr. Pressman is 
to be judged is " ... in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields 
of medical specialization, if any ... " as set forth under Idaho Code § 6-1012. 
Appellants contention that the standard of practice is not what is usually done 
in a given community only applies in the unique situation where what the health care 
provider contends is the local standard of practice is deemed to be a lesser standard than 
an applicable statewide standard or applicable state or federal law or regulation. See 
Grover and Hayward, supra. Otherwise, it is well settled by this Court that "the standard 
of [practice] is simply the care typically provided under similar circumstances by the 
relevant type of health care provider in the community at the time and place of the alleged 
negligent act." Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126,130,75 P.3d 180,184 (2003). (emphasis 
added). 
Appellants also suggest that the failure of Dr. Pressman to take an adequate 
patient history would result in a failure of some unidentified licensing requirement. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 25). Respondents object to the Appellants' references to alleged 
standards and/or regulations which are not part of the record on appeal and which were 
not submitted for consideration to the District Court. Furthermore, there is no explanation 
in Appellants' briefing before this Court as to what these alleged standards and regulations 
are or how Dr. Pressman's conduct in this case in any way violated them based on the 
nature of the patient history he obtained. 
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There is nothing in Dr. Pressman's affidavit or deposition, nor the affidavit of 
Dr. Hofbauer, which in any way suggests or implies the existence of any statewide 
requirement as to what must be contained within a patient history for an ophthalmologist 
in order for it to be deemed "adequate." Again, Appellants' argument on this issue appears 
irrelevant and seems to miss the point since the motion for summary judgment was lost on 
foundational grounds, not whether there was evidence that the standard of practice was 
breached. 
D. What The Standard Of Practice Is In A Given Case Does Not 
Represent A Question Of Fact For The Jury Unless And Until The 
Admissibility Requirements Of Rule 56(e) Have Been Met. 
Appellants contend that the District Court erred by not ruling that the issue 
of what the standard of practice is in this malpractice case should be deemed a question 
of fact for a jury. (Appellants' Brief pp. 24-25). In support of this theory, Appellants rely 
upon the malpractice case of Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519, 746 P.2d 978 (1987). 
Appellants' reliance on this decision is unclear. The sole issue before this Court in Grimes 
appears to have been "whether during the trial of a medical malpractice action, the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant's treatment of plaintiff should be 
gauged and measured by the standard of health care of the community rather than a 
national standard of health care." Id., 113 Idaho at 519,746 P.2d at 978. The defendant 
physician in Grimes obtained a defense verdict after which the District Court granted the 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the grounds that it had wrongly instructed the jury as to 
the standard of practice based on the newly issued decision in Buck v. St. Clair, 108 
Idaho 743, 702 P.2d 781 (1985). This Court concluded that the district court had 
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misapplied the Buck decision and reinstated the defense verdict. Grimes, 113 Idaho at 
520,746 P.2d at 979. 
Respondents contend that the narrow and unrelated jury instruction issue 
addressed by this Court in Grimes is wholly irrelevant to whether the District Court abused 
its discretion in determining that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit was foundationally inadequate and 
therefore inadmissible in this case. The adequacy of a jury instruction comes long after 
it has been determined whether the testifying experts have an adequate foundation for 
their opinions. It is the role of the District Court as the gatekeeper to determine whether 
an adequate foundation exists such that the expert's testimony should be allowed in. See 
Foster v. Trau/, 145 Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186, 190 (2007). In this case, the District 
Court properly concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's opinions were not supported with an 
adequate foundation in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e) and Idaho 
Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. As outlined above, the question of admissibility of affidavits 
under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions for summary 
judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224,1227 (1994). 
Once deemed foundationally inadequate, there is nothing to present to a jury and the 
Grimes decision has no bearing on this issue. 
E. The District Court Properly Determined And Analyzed The 
Burden Of Each Party At The Summary Judgment Stage In This 
Medical Malpractice Case. 
Appellants misinterpret the requirements set forth in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 
and 6-1013 at the summary judgment stage. Appellants state the following in their brief: 
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At summary judgment, the factors set forth in 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 merely act as elements of 
the plaintiff's cause of action and the analysis 
therefore is whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to any element challenged by the 
defendant. In this instance Defendant Pressman 
challenged Plaintiffs' ability to prove a breach of 
the local community standard of care." 
(Appel/ants' Br., pp.17-18). 
Respondents disagree that their motion for summary judgment merely challenged Plaintiffs' 
ability to prove a breach of the local standard. The express intent of the defense motion 
for summary judgment was to determine whether the Plaintiffs had a qualified expert who 
could meet the requirements of Rule 56 (e) and Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. (R. p. 
68-82). This is what the District Court considered and found to be lacking. (R. p. 182-196). 
Appellants were unable to advance beyond the initial inquiry of Rule 56(e) once the District 
Court determined Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit was inadequate. This Court has made it clear, 
that "the admissibility of the expert's testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from 
whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to 
preclude summary judgment." Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
163,45 P.3d 816,819 (2002). 
While Appellants are correct that "the non-moving party is not required to 
respond to any element not addressed by the moving party at summary judgment," the 
Appellants misconstrue the burden placed on them by Rule 56 (e) and Idaho Code §§ 6-
1012 and 6-1013. Although the Appellants are not required to respond to an unaddressed 
element, they are required to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e), which represents 
the District Court's obligated threshold inquiry "to be answered before applying the liberal 
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construction and reasonable inferences rule to the admissible evidence." Dunlap v. 
Garner, 127 Idaho 599,605,903 P.2d 1296, 1302 (1994).5 
F. The District Court Did Not Weigh The Evidence In Favor Of 
Respondents In Granting Summary Judgment. 
Respondents agree with Appellants that the District Court is generally not to 
weigh the strength or quality of the evidence submitted by the parties at the summary 
judgment stage. Respondents further agree that had there been a proper foundation for 
the opinions of Dr. Hofbauer, (such that his affidavit testimony would have been 
admissible), that his affidavit would otherwise have potentially raised multiple issues offact. 
However, because there was not an adequate foundation for the opinions of Dr. Hofbauer 
showing that he had actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice 
applicable to Dr. Pressman in Boise in 2006, Respondents disagree that the District Court 
in any way engaged in weighing the evidence or otherwise interfered with an issue which 
should have been properly left for a jury. 
Appellants provide no specific references to any evidence in the record 
suggesting that the District Court made any credibility determinations. (Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 26-27). Instead, Appellants suggest that Dr. Pressman made inconsistent statements 
between his affidavit and his deposition and that the District Court improperly granted a 
favorable inference regarding this issue to the nonmoving party. (Appellants' Brief, p. 27). 
5 Furthermore, the two cases Appellants cite for the above proposition that "the non-mOVing 
party is not required to respond to any element not addressed by the moving party at summary judgment" 
are not medical malpractice cases and are therefore factually distinguishable. See Idaho Schools for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. State of Idaho, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) (involving questions 
surrounding public school funding pursuant to the Idaho Constitution); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 
Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360 (1997) (involving a personal injury claim arising out of electrocution following 
power termination). 
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Respondents disagree. The affidavit of Dr. Hofbauer states that the foundation for his 
opinions is based solely on his review of Dr. Pressman's deposition and of the Plaintiff's 
medical records. (R. p. 107-112). There is no mention in Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit that he 
relied or even reviewed Dr. Pressman's affidavit. Id. Thus, there was no reason for the 
District Court to get into this issue because Appellants never provided Dr. Hofbauer with 
the allegedly conflicting affidavit of Dr. Pressman.6 
This was specifically addressed by the District Court at oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment: 
Mr. Whitehead: .... And so now we have 
competing affidavits about is it an adequate 
history if you don't ask about a drug that a 
patient's been on that's known in the industry to 
increase the risk of cataract surgery. 
The Court: What am I to make of the doctor's 
statements on page 14 and into 15? It's one 
thing where I understand it's a general standard 
of care to take the history. But on page 14 and 
15 he says, "I'm not aware of what the standard 
of practice in the community was for that 
particular drug at that particular time." How is it 
that your expert can form an opinion based on 
that? 
Mr. Whitehead: In 14 or 15 of his deposition, 
Your Honor? 
6 Respondents contend that Dr. Pressman did not contradict his deposition testimony by his 
subsequent Affidavit. The deposition question posed to Dr. Pressman focused on whether it was the 
standard of practice to disclose to a patient that the drug Flomax carried with it increased potential risk of 
complications during cataract surgery. (R. pp. 154-155). Dr. Pressman testified that the standard of practice 
did not require him to do this. Id. Subsequently, in his Affidavit, Dr. Pressman stated that he had knowledge 
of the risks and benefits of cataract surgery, including the risks associated with the drug commonly known 
as Flomax and that the standard of practice did not require that he ask or consent his patients on this drug 
because it did not amount to a material or significant risk of cataract surgery. (R. p. 64-66). Nothing in Dr. 
Pressman's Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony. 
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The Court: Of his deposition, yeah. My 
understanding is that your retained expert relied 
on the doctor's deposition in coming to his 
opinion about what the local standard of care 
was. 
Mr. Whitehead: Yes. 
The Court: And this is a portion of the deposition 
which, as I read it, the treating physician says I 
don't know what the local standard of care was 
relating to Flomax at that time. 
Mr. Whitehead: Well, he says something 
opposite in his affidavit. I mean, I'll give the guy 
enough credit that he can fish on us. He's the 
defendant in this case. Contradictory statements 
The Court: Except that your expert says that his 
opinion -- the foundation for his opinion is based 
on these deposition statements. 
(Tr. p. 11, II. 9-25 to p. 12, II. 1-13). 
Counsel for the Appellants did not dispute before the District Court that his 
expert had only relied upon Dr. Pressman's deposition regarding his attempts to learn 
about the local standard of practice. Appellants did not ever seek to supplement or 
otherwise supply the District Court with any additional affidavits of Dr. Hofbauer indicating 
that he had now reviewed the affidavit of Dr. Pressman as well, nor does the record reflect 
that Appellants took any action to try and remedy the defects in the foundation relating to 
Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit by way of a motion for reconsideration. Similarly, Appellants did 
not request leave of the District Court by way of Rule 56(f) in an attempt to try and resolve 
the obvious foundational concern raised by the District Court at oral argument. 
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Appellants rely upon the case of Watts Vo Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,870 P.2d 
1300 (1994) to sustain their evidence weighing argument. In Watts, another malpractice 
case, the trial court was presented with various expert affidavits in support of, and in 
opposition to, the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment. Ido 125 Idaho at 
346, 870 P.2d at 1305. The plaintiffs expert, Dr. Cohen, submitted an affidavit in which 
he stated he learned about the standard of practice based on information received from 
another dentist, Dr. Branz. Ido The defendant then obtained an affidavit from Dr. Branz, 
in which he disputed much of the foundational information contained within Dr. Cohen's 
affidavit that the defendant had violated the standard of practice. Ido at 344, 870 P.2d at 
1303. 
Faced with these competing affidavits, the trial court elected to reject Dr. 
Cohen's affidavit based on the statements contained within Dr. Branz's affidavit. Id. This 
Court understandably reversed, holding that "by rejecting Dr. Cohen's affidavit, the trial 
court erroneously involved itself in weighing conflicting evidence rather than determining 
whether, for the purposes of summary judgment, [the plaintiff] had offered sufficient 
evidence." Ido The Court further noted "that the trial court found Dr. Branz' affidavit more 
truthful or convincing involves issues of weighing facts, which are not to be considered as 
the basis for a grant of summary judgment." Ido 
The actions of the District Court in the case at bar evidence that it did not 
weigh the facts nor the quality or quantity of the evidence submitted. There is no evidence 
that the District Court ever engaged in any credibility determinations as between Dr. 
Hofbauer and Dr. Pressman. Instead, the District Court properly focused its attention on 
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determining whether the submissions of the parties complied with the foundational 
requirements of Rule 56(e) - which the Appellants did not. 
It states: 
G. Respondents Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant 
To Idaho Code § 12-121 And I.A.R. 41(a). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) governs the award of attorney fees. 
In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion 
of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 
12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the 
court only when it finds, from the facts presented 
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be 
awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho 
Code, on a default judgment. 
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees, but 
merely establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121.'" Newberryv. Martens, 142 
Idaho 284,292,127 P.2d 187,195 (2005) (citing Huffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,277 n.1, 647 
P.2d 730, 733 n.1 (1982)). 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under 
that statute [Idaho Code § 12-121] only if this 
Court is left with the abiding belief that the 
appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. Where 
an appeal turns on the question of law, an 
award of attorney fees under this section is 
proper if the law is well settled and the 
appellant has made no substantial showing 
that the district court misapplied the law. 
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Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 729, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
Respondents contend that the case authority interpreting Rule 56(e) and 
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 specifically discuss the steps an out-of-area expert 
must take in order to sufficiently familiarize himself or herself with the local standard of 
practice. The actions of Dr. Hofbauer, relying solely on Dr. Pressman's deposition in order 
to familiarize himself, resulted in a foundationally defective affidavit despite the presence 
of well-established Idaho case authorities regarding summary judgment in medical 
malpractice cases. Based on the record before the Court, Respondents contend the 
Appellants have unreasonably pursued this appeal and have failed to establish a credible 
misapplication of the law by the District Court. In light of the substantial expenses incurred 
as a result of this undertaking, Respondents respectfully request that they be awarded 
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a). 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit failed to 
comply with the threshold foundational requirements set forth under Rule 56(e). Dr. 
Hofbauer is an out-of-area physician. His affidavit states he relied upon the deposition 
testimony of the Defendant physician to learn about the local standard of practice. This 
deposition did not set forth the required information which the District Court properly 
concluded prevented Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit from being admissible. The District Court 
properly granted the Respondents' motion for summary judgment and the Respondents 
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respectfully request this Court affirm the District Court's decision in all respects and that 
the Respondents be awarded costs and attorney fees for defending against this appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2010. 
CAREY ~N~ LLP 
/ 
By ... I/Itl)iJIl 
~T~e-rr~e~n~ce~=.~=-~~~=--------
ja Prutina, Of the Firm 
A torneys for Defendants/Respondents 
Scott H. Pressman, M.D. and The Eye 
Associates, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of October, 2010, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Kenneth L. Pedersen 
Jarom A. Whitehead 
PEDERSEN & WHITEHEAD 
161 5th Avenue South, Suite 301 
P. O. Box 2349 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2349 
Telephone (208) 734-2552 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Franz Suhadolnik and Betty Suhadolnik 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 29 
[Xl u.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile (208) 734-2772 
